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Abstract— The mobile ad-hoc network consists of energy 
constraint devices called nodes communicating through radio 
signals forming a temporary network i.e. nodes are continuously 
switching from one network to another. To minimize the power 
consumption, we form the clusters with an elected cluster head 
(Service Provider) based on any cluster head selection strategy. 
As the topology of this network is time variant attributable to 
node mobility, nodes are continuously leaving and entering the 
clusters, automatically registering with the cluster head to 
become the member of the cluster. But, there can be a scenario 
where a new node wants to access a service provided by the 
cluster head, at this time the newly entered node is unaware of 
the trustworthiness of the cluster head. To establish a trusted 
link amongst newly entered node and CH we have adopted an 
indirect trust computation technique based on recommendations, 
which form an important component in trust-based access 
control models for pervasive environment. It can provide the new 
node the confidence to interact with unknown service provider or 
CH to establish a trusted link for reliable accessibility of the 
service. In this paper, we shall present some existing indirect 
trust based techniques and subsequently discuss our proposal 
along with its merits and future scope. 
 
Keywords—:Cluster Head, Indirect Trust Computation, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are composed of 
fully autonomous wireless devices forming a temporary 
networks, these are suitable in the environment where the 
infrastructure is not fixed or we can say that infrastructure is 
time variant. In case of fixed hard-wired networks attacks are 
predictable with physical defense at firewalls and gateways, 
whereas, attacks on MANETs can come from any directions 
and may target any node. Due to dynamic topology of the 
networks any security solution with static configuration are 
not sufficient. Any node participating the network should not 
be directly trusted without verifying its trust information. If 
the trust information is available for each and every node in 
the network, then it is convenient to take precautionary 
measures to prevent the attacks using appropriate intrusion 
detection techniques. Moreover, it will be more sensible to 
reject or ignore hostile service requests. As the overall 
environment in MANET is cooperative by default, these trust 
relationships are extremely susceptible to attacks. So, in order 
to avoid the overhead of handling the network as a whole, 
nodes are grouped into clusters.  
There are several cluster formation strategies which are 
used to form the clusters, most of these techniques are based 
on the degree of connectivity of a particular node. A node 
having highest degree of connectivity i.e. it is surrounded by 
maximum neighbours, then the node is elected as cluster head. 
There are also some other parameters such as, energy, node-id, 
etc. which can be taken into consideration while electing a 
cluster head. For simplicity we will be considering the static 
mobility model with heterogeneous nodes i.e. each node will 
be having different capabilities. The node having more 
computing power and battery life can be elected as a cluster 
head, as it will handle inter cluster communication and 
computation. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The dynamism of pervasive computing environment allows 
ad hoc interaction of known and unknown autonomous 
entities that are unfamiliar and possibly hostile. In such 
environment where the service requesters have no personal 
experience with unknown service providers (here cluster 
heads), trust and recommendation models are used to evaluate 
the trustworthiness of unfamiliar entities. Recently, research 
in designing defense mechanisms to detect dishonest 
recommendation in these open distributed environments has 
been carried out [1-18]. The defense mechanisms against 
dishonest recommendations has been grouped into two broad 
categories, namely exogenous method and endogenous 
method [1].The approaches that fall under endogenous method 
use other external factors along with the recommendations 
(reputation of recommender and credibility of recommender) 
to decide the trustworthiness of the given recommendation. 
However, these approaches assume that only highly reputed 
recommenders can give honest recommendations and vice 
versa. In endogenous method, the recommendation seeker has 
no personal experience with the entity in question. It relies 
only on the recommendations provided by the recommender 
to detect dishonest recommendation. The method believes that 
dishonest recommendations have different statistical patterns 
from honest recommendations. Therefore, in this method, 
filtering of dishonest recommendation is based on analyzing 
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and comparing the recommendations themselves. In trust 
models where indirect trust based on recommendations is used 
only once to allow a stranger entity to interact, endogenous 
method based on the majority rule is commonly used. 
Dellarocas [13] has proposed an approach based on controlled 
anonymity to separate unfairly high ratings and fair ratings. 
This approach is unable to handle unfairly low ratings [14]. In 
[15], a filtering algorithm based on the beta distribution is 
proposed to determine whether each recommendation Ri falls 
between q quartile (lower) and (1 − q) quartile (upper). 
Whenever a recommendation does not lie between the lower 
and upper quartile, it is considered malicious and its 
recommendation is excluded. The technique assumes that 
recommendations follow beta distribution and is effective 
only if there are effectively many recommendations. Weng et 
al. in [16] proposed a filtering mechanism based on entropy. 
The basic idea is that if a recommendation is too different 
from majority opinion, then it could be unfair. The approach is 
similar to other reputation-based models except that it uses 
entropy to differentiate between different recommendations. A 
context-specific and reputation-based trust model for 
pervasive computing environment was proposed [17] to detect 
malicious recommendation based on control chart method. 
The control chart method uses mean and standard deviation to 
calculate the lower confidence limit (LCL) and upper 
confidence limit (UCL). It is assumed that the 
recommendation values that lie outside the interval defined by 
LCL and UCL are malicious, therefore discarded from the set 
of valid recommendations. It considers that a metrical distance 
exists between valid and invalid recommendations. As a result, 
the rate of filtering out the false positive and false negative 
recommendation is really high. Deno et al. [18] proposed an 
iterative filtering method for the process of detecting 
malicious recommendations. In this model [18], an average 
trust value (Tavg) of all the recommendations received (TR) is 
calculated. The inequality | Tavg (B) − TR(B) | > S, where B is 
the entity for which recommendations are collected from i 
recommenders (R) and S is a predefined threshold in the 
interval [0 1], is evaluated. If that inequality holds, then the 
recommendation is false and is filtered out. The method is 
repeated until all false recommendations are filtered out. The 
effectiveness of this approach depends on choosing a suitable 
value for S. These detection mechanisms can be easily 
bypassed if a relatively small bias is introduced in dishonest 
recommendations. 
III. PROPOSED APPROACH 
The main goal of Mobile Ad-hoc Network is to establish 
trusted connection amongst each other. We can define 
scenarios in MANET where a newly joined node wants to 
establish a secure connection with a particular CH from the set 
on CHs. To evaluate the trustworthiness of these CHs we have 
adopted indirect trust mechanism approach [19] and we have 
evaluated the performance and effectiveness of this technique 
for evaluating the trustworthiness of particular service 
provider (CH). The trust in short is computed on the basis of 
recommendations from the associated members which are 
frequently interacting with the service providers and the other 
members in the pervasive environment. In this approach, we 
define a scenario consisting of cluster formed using 
heterogeneous mobile nodes with static mobility model, in 
this cluster we take (for ex. 4) cluster heads, each of these 
CHs will perform their tasks in round robin fashion with fixed 
time slice i.e. at a time only one CH will be active. Now we 
divide our scenario into 3 phases: 
 
A. Interaction Phase 
B. Request Phase 
C. Trust Evaluation Phase 
 
A. Interaction Phase 
 
In this phase we generate the interactions between the each 
cluster head and the member nodes and depending on the 
number of successful interactions and by considering some 
other communication parameters the member nodes will 
generate feedback values in the range from 1 to 10. These 
feedbacks or recommendations will be stored with the 
member nodes for each of the cluster head. The interaction 
phase can be visualized from fig 1(b). 
 
 
Fig. 1  MANET with static mobility model 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Nodes interacting with CH-2 and generating feedbacks. 
 
B. Request Phase 
 
Now let us assume that some user or node wants to access a 
secure connection with any of the cluster head which also acts 
as service provider for particular service such as gateway 
service, ftp server, etc. but the node is not sure about the 
trustworthiness of the cluster heads. So when the node will 
enter the cluster it will request for trust ratings to all the 
cluster heads which then will serve this request during their 
respective active periods, fig 1(c). 
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Fig. 3 Newly Entered Node requesting for Trust Value to all CHs  
 
 
 
Fig. 4 CH-1 gathering recommendations from member nodes. 
 
C. Trust Evaluation Phase 
After requesting the trust rating by the newly entered node, 
all the CHs will aggregate the recommendations from the 
member nodes in their respective active periods and will apply 
the indirect trust mechanism to evaluate the trust rating. The 
cluster head whose trust rating is greater than 0.5 will be 
treated as trusted but, if there are more than one trusted CHs 
then the CH with the highest trust rating will be chosen for 
establishing the secure connection. The node establishing 
secure connection with CH with highest trust rating can be 
seen in fig 1(f). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Each CH reporting Trust Value to new node U-1 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Node U-1 establishes secure connection with CH having highest 
trust value. 
 
IV. WORKING OF INDIRECT TRUST MECHANISM 
The objective of indirect trust computation [19] is to 
determine the trustworthiness of an unfamiliar service 
provider from the set of recommendations that narrow the gap 
between the derived recommendation and the actual 
trustworthiness of the target service. In our approach, a 
dishonest recommendation is defined as an outlier that appears 
to be inconsistent with other recommendations and has a low 
probability that it originated from the same statistical 
distribution as the other recommendation in the data set. The 
importance of detecting outliers in data has been recognized in 
the fields of database and data mining for a long time. The 
outlier deviation-based approach was first proposed in [21], in 
which an exact exception problem was discussed. In [20], the 
author presented a new method for deviation-based outlier 
detection in a large database. The algorithm locates the outlier 
by a dynamic programming method. The approach (Algorithm 
1) is based on the fact that if a recommendation is far from the 
median value of a given recommendation set and has a lower 
frequency of occurrence, it is filtered out as a dishonest 
recommendation. Suppose that an entity X requests to access 
service A. If service A has no previous interaction history 
with X, it will broadcast the request for recommendations, 
with respect to X. Let R denote the set of recommendations 
collected from recommenders. 
 
R= {r1, r2, r3……………….rn} 
 
Where ‘n’ is the total number of recommendations. Since 
smart attackers can give recommendations with little bias to 
go undetected, we divide the range of possible 
recommendation values into b intervals (or bins). These bins 
define which recommendations we consider to be similar to 
each other such that all recommendations that lie in the same 
bin are considered alike. ‘b’ has an impact on the detection 
rate. If the bins are too wide, honest recommendations might 
get filtered out as dishonest. On the other hand, if the bins are 
too narrow, some dishonest recommendations may appear to 
be honest and vice versa. For this approach authors have tuned 
b = 10 such that Rc1 comprises all recommendations that lie 
between interval [0 0.1], Rc2 comprises all recommendations 
between interval [0.1 0.2], and so on for (Rc3, . . . , Rc10). 
After grouping the recommendations in their respective bins, 
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we compute a histogram that shows count fi of the 
recommendations falling in each bin. Let H be a histogram of 
a set of recommendation classes where 
 
H(R)={<Rc1,f1>,<Rc2,f2>,<Rc3,f3>,<Rc4,f4>,<Rc5,f5>,<Rc6,
f6>,<Rc7,f7>,<Rc8,f8>,<Rc8,f8>,<Rc9,f9>,<Rc10,f10>} 
 
Where fi is the total number of recommendations falling in 
Rci. From this histogram H(R), we remove all the 
recommendation classes with zero frequencies and get the 
domain set (Rdomain) and frequency set (f) 
 
Rdomain= {Rc1, Rc2, Rc3,…………. Rc10,} 
f   = {f1, f2, f3,………, f10} 
 
 
 
Definition 1. The dissimilarity function DF(xi) is defined as, 
 
 
             (1) 
 
 
Where xi is a recommendation class from a 
recommendation set x. 
Under this mechanism, the dissimilarity value of xi is 
dependent on the square of absolute deviation from the 
median, i.e., |xi − median(x)|
2. The median is used to detect 
deviation because it is resistant to outliers. The presence of 
outliers does not change the value of the median. In Equation 
1, the square of absolute deviation from the median is taken to 
signify the impact of extremes, i.e., the farther the 
recommendation value xi is from the median, the larger the 
squared deviation is. Moreover, the dissimilarity value of xi is 
inversely proportional to its frequency. In Equation 1, |xi − 
median(x)|
2
 is divided by frequency fi. In this way, if a 
recommendation is very far from the rest of the 
recommendations and its frequency of occurrence is also low, 
Equation 1 will return a high value. Similarly, if a 
recommendation is close to the rest of the recommendations 
(i.e., similar to each other) and its frequency of occurrence is 
also high, Equation 1 will return a low value. 
For each Rci, a dissimilarity value is computed using 
Equation 1 to represent its dissimilarity from the rest of the 
recommendations with regard to their frequency of occurrence. 
All the recommendation classes in Rdomain are then sorted 
with respect to their dissimilarity value DF(Rci) in descending 
order. The recommendation class at the top of the sorted 
Rdomain with respect to its DF(xj) is considered to be the 
most suspicious one to be filtered out as dishonest 
recommendation. Once the Rdomain is sorted, the next step is 
to determine the set of dishonest recommendation classes 
from Rdomain set. To help find the set of dishonest 
recommendation classes from the set of recommendations in 
Rdomain, Arning et al. [21] defined a measure called 
smoothing factor (SF). 
 
Definition 2. A SF for each SRdomain is computed as, 
 
SF(SRdomainj)=C(Rdomain -SRdomainj) x (DF(Rdomain)-
DF(SRdomainj))                      (2) 
 
Where j = 1, 2, 3 . . . , m, and m is the total number of 
distinct elements in SRdomain. C is the cardinality function 
and is taken as the frequency of elements in a set {Rdomain − 
SRdomainj}. The SF indicates how much the dissimilarity can 
be reduced by removing a suspicious set of recommendation 
(SRdomain) from the Rdomain. 
 
Definition 3. The dishonest recommendation domain 
(Rdomaindishonest) is a subset of Rdomain that contributes most 
to the dissimilarity of Rdomain and with the least number of 
recommendations, i.e., Rdomaindishonest ⊆ Rdomain. We say 
that SRdomainx is a set of dishonest recommendation classes 
with respect to SRdomain, C, and DF (SRdomainj) if 
 
SF(SRdomainx) >= SF(SRdomainj)  x, j ∈ m 
 
In order to find out the set of dishonest recommendation 
Rdomaindishonest from Rdomain, the mechanism defined by 
the proposed approach is as follows: 
•Let Rck be the k
th recommendation class of Rdomain and   
SRdomain be the set of suspicious   recommendation classes 
from Rdomain, i.e., SRdomain ⊆ Rdomain. 
•Initially, SRdomain is an empty set, SRdomain0 = {}. 
•Compute SF (SRdomaink) for each SRdomaink formed by 
taking the union of SRdomaink − 1 and Rck. 
 
SRdomaink = SRdomaink-1 U Rck                   (3) 
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where k = 1, 2, 3 . . . , m − 1, and m is the distinct   
recommendation class value number  in sorted Rdomain. 
•The subset SRdomaink with the largest SF (SRdomaink) is 
considered as a set containing dishonest recommendation 
classes. 
•If two or more subsets in SRdomaink have the largest SF, 
the one with minimum frequency is detected as the set 
containing dishonest recommendation classes. 
After detecting the set Rdomaindishonest, we remove all 
recommendations that fall under the dishonest 
recommendation classes. 
 
An Illustrative Example  
To illustrate how this deviation detection mechanism filters 
out unfair recommendations, this section provides an example 
that goes through each step of our proposed approach. Let X 
be a service requester who has no prior experience with 
service provider or CH. In order to determine the 
trustworthiness of CH, X will get registered with CH and will 
request for its trust value, CH in turn will request 
recommendations from its peer services who have previous 
interaction with X. Let R = {r1, r2, r3, . . . . . . , rn } be a set of 
recommendations received by n = 10 recommenders for 
service requester R. After receiving the recommendations, 
they are grouped in their respective bins. Table 1 shows how 
the received recommendations are grouped in their respective 
classes. After arranging the recommendations in their 
respective recommendation class Rci, we remove the 
recommendation classes with zero frequencies and calculate 
DF (Rci) for each recommendation class using Equation 1. 
Table 2 shows the sorted list of recommendation classes with 
respect to their dissimilarity value. In Table 2 the 
recommendation class Rc6 has the highest deviation value, so 
it is taken as a suspicious recommendation class and is added 
to the suspicious recommendation domain (SRdomain), and 
its SF is calculated. Next we take the union of the suspicious 
recommendation domain SRdomain1 and the next 
recommendation class in the sorted list, i.e., Rc4 and calculate 
its SF using Equation 2. This process is repeated for each Rci 
of Rdomain until SRdomain = Rdomain − Rcm, where m = 6. 
Table 3 shows that the SF of SRdomain2 has the highest value. 
Therefore, the recommendation classes {1.0, 0.8} in 
SRdomain3 are considered as dishonest recommendation 
classes, and these recommendation classes are removed from 
the Rdomain. 
TABLE I 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rci 
(rci) 
Recommendation value Frequency fi 
Rc1 0.1 2 
Rc2 0.2 1 
Rc3 0.3 0 
Rc4 0.4 3 
Rc5 0.5 0 
Rc6 0.6 2 
Rc7 0.7 0 
Rc8 0.8 1 
Rc9 0.9 0 
Rc10 1.0 1 
 
TABLE II 
RECOMMENDATION CLASSES SORTED WITH RESPECT TO THEIR DF 
Rci Recommendation value rci Frequency fi DF (Rci) 
Rc6 1.0 1 0.81 
Rc5 0.8 1 0.49 
Rc4 0.6 2 0.125 
Rc3 0.4 3 0.03 
Rc2 0.2 1 0.01 
Rc1 0.1 2 0 
 
TABLE III 
SMOOTHING FACTOR COMPUTATION 
SRdomain Rdomain-  
SRdomain 
DF(R
domain-
SRdoma
in) 
SF 
{1.0} {0.8,0.6,0.4,0.2,0.1} 0.81 7.29 
{1.0,0.8} {0.6,0.4,0.2,0.1} 1.3 10.4 
{1.0,0.8,0.6} {0.4,0.2,0.1} 1.425 8.55 
{1.0,0.8,0.6,0.4} {0.2,0.1} 1.455 4.365 
{1.0,0.8,0.6,0.4,0.2} {0.1} 1.465 2.93 
 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we evaluate our model in a simulated cluster 
based MANET environment. We carry out different sets of 
experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
model against different attack scenarios (BM attack, BS attack, 
and RO attack). Results indicate that the model is able to 
respond to all three types of attack when the percentage of 
malicious recommenders is varied from 10% to 40%. We have 
also studied the performance of the model by varying the 
offset introduced by the malicious recommender in their 
recommended trust value. It was observed that the 
performance of the models decreases only when the 
percentage of malicious recommenders is above 30% and the 
mean offset between the honest and dishonest 
recommendation is minimum (0.2). 
 
Experimental setup 
We simulate a MANET environment using a Java based 
simulator, where nodes (offering and requesting services) are 
continuously joining and leaving the environment. The nodes 
are categorized into two groups, i.e., agents offering services 
as service provider nodes (SPN) and nodes consuming 
services as service requesting nodes (SRN). We conduct a 
series of experiments for a new SRN to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of an unknown SPN by requesting 
recommendation from other SPNs in the environment. All 
SPNs can also act as recommending agents (RA) for other 
SPNs. The RA gives recommendations, in a continuous range 
[0 1], for a given SPN on the request of a SRN. The RA can 
either be honest or dishonest depending on the trustworthiness 
of its recommendation. An honest RA truthfully provides 
recommendation based on its personal experience, whereas a 
dishonest RA insinuates a true experience to a high, low, or 
erratic recommendation with a malicious intent. The 
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environment is initialized with set numbers of honest and 
dishonest recommenders (N = 10 to 100). 
 
A. Experiment 1: validation against attacks 
To analyse the effectiveness of the proposed approach, 
three inherent attack scenarios (bad mouthing, ballot stuffing, 
and random opinion attack) for recommendation models have 
been implemented in the above defined simulation 
environment. 
 
1) Bad mouthing attack 
BM is one in which the intention of the attacker is to send 
malicious recommendations that will cause the evaluated 
trustworthiness of an entity to decrease. Let us suppose that 
the service provider asks for recommendations regarding an 
unknown service provider node CH-1. In this experiment we 
assume that a certain percentage of the recommenders are 
dishonest and launch a BM attack against (CH-1) by giving 
dishonest recommendations. It is assumed that the actual trust 
value of CH-1 is 0.9. At the initial step of the simulation, the 
environment has 10% dishonest RA who attempt to launch a 
bad mouthing attack against A by providing low 
recommended trust values (between the range [0 0.3]). To 
elaborate the efficacy of the proposed approach, we vary the 
percentage of dishonest recommenders from 10% to 40%. 
Figure 7 a, b, c, d shows the SF calculated for each SRdomain. 
It is shown that in each case the proposed approach is able to 
detect the set of bad mouthers giving low recommendation 
between 0.1 and 0.3, also the  experiment has been performed 
for N=30. For example, in Figure 7a when the percentage of 
dishonest recommenders is 10%, the SRdomains and 
respective SF values are as follows: 
 
 SRdomain 1{0.1}                       23.49 
SRdomain 2{0.1,0.2}                        40.6 
SRdomain 3{0.1,0.2,0.3}       52.38 
SRdomain 4{0.1,0.2,0.3,0.8}         34.9992 
SRdomain 5{0.1,0.2,0.3,0.8,0.9}   13.6171 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Fig. 7 Detecting Attacks. (a) BM, 10% dishonest recommender. (b) BM, 
20% dishonest recommender. (c) BM, 30% dishonest recommender. (d) BM, 
40% dishonest recommender. 
 
Since the SF of SRdomain 3 has the highest value, the 
recommendation classes {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} are considered as 
dishonest recommendation classes, and the recommendations 
that belong to these recommendation classes are considered as 
dishonest recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
2) Ballot stuffing attack 
BS is one in which the intention of the attacker is to send 
malicious recommendations that will cause the evaluated 
trustworthiness of an entity to increase. Let us suppose that 
the service requester asks for recommendations regarding an 
unknown service provider CH-1. It is assumed that the actual 
trust value of CH-1 is 0.3. A certain percentage of 
recommenders providing the recommendation to the service 
provider are dishonest and gives a high recommendation value 
between 0.8 and 1.0, thus launching a BS attack. We evaluate 
the proposed approach by varying the percentage of dishonest 
recommenders from 10% to 40%. Figure 7 e, f, g, h shows the 
SF values for SRdomains in each case. It is evident from the 
results that the model is able to detect dishonest 
recommendations even when the percentage of dishonest 
recommendations is 40%. From Figure 7h (when the 
percentage of dishonest recommendations is 40%), the SF 
values of each SRdomain are as follows: 
SRdomain 1{1.0}                5.265 
SRdomain 2{1.0,0.8}               8.413 
SRdomain 3{1.0,0.8,0.9} 8.884 
SRdomain 4{1.0,0.8,0.9,0.3} 6.006 
SRdomain5{1.0,0.8,0.9,0.3,0.2} 3.013 
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(e) 
 
(f) 
 
 
(g) 
 
 
(h) 
Fig. 7 Detecting Attacks. (e) BS, 10% dishonest recommender. (f) BS, 
20% dishonest recommender. (g) BS, 30% dishonest recommender. (h) BS, 
40% dishonest recommender. 
 
The proposed approach is able to detect the dishonest 
recommendations as SRdomain3 with the highest SF value of 
8.88. 
 
3) Random opinion attack 
RO attack is one in which the malicious recommender 
gives the recommendations randomly opposite the true 
behavior of the entity in question. Let us suppose that the 
recommenders launch a RO attack while providing 
recommendations for a service provider node CH-1. The 
dishonest recommenders provide either very low 
recommendations (0.1 to 0.2) or very high recommendations 
(0.8 to 1.0). We vary the percentage of dishonest 
recommenders from 10% to 40% for the experiment. The SF 
values for the respective SRdomains in each case are shown in 
Figure 7 i, j, k, l. The proposed approach successfully detects 
random opinion attack and is able to filter out the dishonest set 
of recommenders in each case. From Figure 7i (when the 
percentage of dishonest recommendations is 10%), the SF 
values of each SRdomain are as follows: 
 
SRdomain 1{0.1} 7.25 
SRdomain 2{0.1,1.0} 11.48 
SRdomain 3{0.1,1.0,0.2} 15.39 
SRdomain 4{0.1,1.0,0.2,0.3} 9.251 
SRdomain 5{0.1,1.0,0.2,0.3,0.4} 6.448 
SRdomain 6{0.1,1.0,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.7} 2.939 
 
(i) 
 
 
(j) 
 
(k) 
 
(l) 
Fig. 7 Detecting Attacks.  (i) RO, 10% dishonest recommender. (j) RO, 
20% dishonest recommender. (k) RO, 30% dishonest recommender. (l) 
RO, 40% dishonest recommender. 
B. Experiment 2: validation against deviation 
The detection rate of unfair recommendations by varying 
the number of malicious recommenders cannot fully describe 
the performance of the model as the damage caused by 
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different malicious recommenders can be very different 
depending on the disparity between the true recommendation 
and unfair recommendation (i.e., offset). The offset introduced 
by the attackers in the recommended trust value is a key factor 
in instilling deviation in the evaluated trust value of SPN. We 
have carried out a set of experiments to observe the impact of 
different offset values introduced by different malicious 
recommenders on the final trust value. We define mean offset 
(MO) as the difference between the mean of honest 
recommendations and the mean of dishonest 
recommendations. For the experiment, we have divided MO 
into four different levels L1 = 0.1, L2 = 0.2, L3 = 0.4, and L4 
= 0.8. It is assumed that the actual trust value of SPN is less 
than equal to 0.5, and the dishonest recommender’s goal is to 
boost the recommended trust value of SPN (BS attack). The 
experiment was conducted in four different rounds by varying 
the MO level from L1 to L4 (i.e., from maximum to 
minimum). In each round, the recommended trust value is 
computed with different percentages of dishonest 
recommenders (10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%). 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Fig. 8. Mean Offset Analysis. (a) Mean Offset L1.  (b) Mean Offset L2.  
(c) Mean Offset L3.  (d) Mean Offset L4 
C. Comparison with existing approaches 
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed deviation-
based approach in detecting dishonest recommendations, we 
have compared our approach with other approaches proposed 
in the literature based on quartile [15], control limit chart [17], 
and iterative filtering [18] to detect dishonest 
recommendations in indirect trust computation. A set of 
experiments has been carried out by applying the approaches 
to detect dishonest recommendations in two different 
scenarios. For the first set of experiments, we assume that a 
certain percentage of the recommenders are dishonest and 
launch bad mouthing attack by giving recommendations 
between 0.1 to 0.3. For the second set of experiments, the 
dishonest recommenders are assumed to give a high 
recommendation value in range [0.8, 1.0], thus launching a 
ballot stuffing attack. In both set of experiments, the 
percentage of dishonest recommenders is varied from 10% to 
45%. For comparison, we have used Matthews’s correlation 
coefficient (MCC) to measure the accuracy of all four 
approaches in detecting dishonest recommendations [22]. 
MCC is defined as a measure of the quality of binary (two-
class) classifications. It takes into account true and false 
positives and negatives. The formula used for MCC 
calculation is 
 
Where TP is the number of true positives, TN is the number 
of true negatives, FP is the number of false positives, and FN 
is the number of false negatives. MCC returns a value 
between − 1 and 1 (1 means perfect filtering, 0 indicates no 
better than random filtering, and − 1 represents total inverse 
filtering). To avoid infinite results while calculating MCC, it is 
assumed that if any of the four sums (TP, FP, TN, and FN) in 
the denominator is zero, the denominator is arbitrarily set to 
one. The Figure 4 shows the comparison of MCC values of 
the proposed approach with different model with varying 
percentage of dishonest recommendations (from 10% to 40%). 
According to the results, the proposed approach can 
effectively detect dishonest recommendations evident from a 
constant MCC of +1 for both sets of experiments. On the 
other hand, in [17], in the case of bad mouthing attack (Figure 
9a), MCC increases slowly as the percentage of dishonest 
recommenders increases from 10% to 30% but then decreases 
promptly to 0 as the percentage of dishonest recommender 
increases from 30% to 45%. The same behavior was observed 
in the case of ballot stuffing attack (Figure 9b). In [18], when 
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the percentage of dishonest recommender increases to 40%, 
the MCC rate starts to decrease as well. Thus, all three 
approaches ([17, 18], and [13]) fail to achieve perfect filtering 
of dishonest recommendation as the percentage of dishonest 
recommenders increases. 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Fig. 9.  Filtering accuracy in terms of MCC. (a) Bad mouthing Attack. (b) 
Ballot Stuffing Attack [19]. 
 
For an in-depth analysis of [17, 18], and [13], false positive 
rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) are computed for 
using the following equations: 
 
The value of FPR and FNR lies between [0 1]. The lower 
value of FPR and FNR indicates better performance. Figure 
10a shows the comparison of FNR and FPR of [17] with the 
proposed approach based on the results accumulated after the 
experiments for BM attack. Although the FPR of [17] remains 
consistent at zero when the percentage of dishonest 
recommendations is the value of FPR and FNR lies between 
[0 1]. The lower value of FPR and FNR indicates better 
performance. Figure 10a shows the comparison of FNR and 
FPR of [17] with the proposed approach based on the results 
accumulated after the experiments for BM attack. Although 
the FPR of [17] remains consistent at zero when the 
percentage of dishonest recommendations is increased from 
10% to 40%, at the same time, its FNR progressively 
increases and reaches its maximum value at 40%. Similarly, 
Figure 10b shows that [18] maintains zero FPR and FNR until 
dishonest recommenders are less than 30% of the total 
recommenders. However, as the number of dishonest 
recommenders increases above 30%, the model behaves 
poorly by showing a rapid increase in FPR and FNR. Figure 
10c shows that although the FPR of [13] improves as the 
percentage of dishonest recommenders’ increases, 
simultaneously, the FNR starts to grow rapidly for 
percentages greater than 20%. On the contrary, the proposed 
approach maintains zero FNR and FPR even when the 
percentage of dishonest recommenders reaches 40%. Figure 
11a explicates the results observed from the performance of 
[17] under ballot stuffing attack. The approach maintains zero 
FPR throughout the experiment; however, it filtered out a high 
number of honest recommenders as dishonest, evident from 
the high FNR. Similarly, the performance of [18] remains 
stable until the percentage of dishonest recommenders 
remains below 30% (Figure 11b). However, the approach also 
shows a rapid growth in FNR as the percentage of dishonest 
recommenders increases above 30%. Figure 11c shows that 
[13] is completely unable to detect ballot stuffing. The 
approach shows a high FPR even at low percentages of 
dishonest recommenders. It can be seen from the results of 
Figures 5 and 6 that the proposed approach remains resistant 
to the attack under both experiments (as the FPR and FNR 
remains zero), thus outperforming other approaches. 
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(c) 
 
Fig. 10. FPR vs FNR (in Bad Mouthing Attack).  (a) Control Limit Chart.  
(b) Iterative Filtering.  (c) Quartile Filtering [19] 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
Fig. 11. FPR vs FNR (in Ballot Stuffing Attack).  (a) Control Limit Chart.  
(b) Iterative Filtering.  (c) Quartile Filtering. [19] 
 
From the above discussion, we can conclude that both [17] 
and [13] perform poorly in the presence of increasing 
percentage of dishonest recommenders. It is also observed that 
[18] performs well provided that the recommendation 
threshold is selected appropriately. On the contrary, the 
proposed approach is not reliant on any external parameter 
and is able to detect 100% dishonest recommenders provided 
that they are in the minority (<50%). 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
An application of indirect trust mechanism in MANET 
environment is proposed in the above work. The main focus in 
this present work was to detect dishonest recommendations 
based on their dissimilarity value from the complete 
recommendation set. Since median is resistant to outlier, we 
have proposed a dissimilarity function that captures how 
dissimilar a recommendation class is from the median of the 
recommendation set. The algorithm uses a smoothing factor 
which detects malicious recommendations by evaluating the 
impact on the dissimilarity metric by removing a subset of 
recommendation classes from the set of recommendations. 
Experimental evaluation shows the effectiveness of our 
proposed method in filtering dishonest recommendations in 
comparison with the base model. Results show that the 
proposed method is successfully able to detect dishonest 
recommendations by utilizing absolute deviation from the 
median as compared to the base technique which tends to fail 
as the percentage of dishonest recommendations increases. 
We have carried out a detailed comparative analysis with the 
base approach by varying the percentage and the offset 
introduced by the dishonest recommendations. Results that 
indicate improved performance of the proposed approach, 
which is able to produce 70% detection rate at a minimum 
offset of 0.2, have been shown. On the contrary, the base 
approach is unable to detect any dishonest recommendations 
at all. It is also shown that for different attacks (bad mouthing, 
ballot stuffing, and random opinion attack), the proposed 
method successfully filters out dishonest recommendations. A 
comparison between existing approaches and the proposed 
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approach is also presented, which clearly shows the better 
performance of the proposed approach. In our future work, we 
will try to incorporate fuzzy or rule based engine to evaluate 
the trust value from the recommendation sets. 
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